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Here we present a Multiple Observer Probability Analysis (MOPA) for the purpose of clarifying
topics in experimental Bell scenarios. Because Bell scenarios are interested in quantum effects be-
tween nonlocal measurement devices, we assign an observer to each device: Alice and Bob. Given
that the observers are stationary and space-like separated, each observer is privy to different in-
formation along their shared equi-temporal lines due to permutations in the order they observe
events. Therefore, each observer is inclined to assign different probability distributions to the same
set of propositions due to these informational differences. The observers are obligated to update
their probability distributions on the basis of locally observed events, and in this sense, factuality
is informational locality. In this framework, only local variables or detections may be factual, but
nothing prevents an observer from inquiring or making if-then inferences on the counterfactual basis
of a nonlocal proposition being true. Indeed the objects pertaining to these nonlocal counterfactual
propositions may be far outside an observer’s light cone. The MOPA arrives at the conclusion that
the CHSH inequality is only nonlocally violated counterfactually by each observer whereas local
violations of the CHSH may be factual or counterfactual. We believe the MOPA to better gel prob-
ability theory (and thus QM) with Special Relativity than does the standard locality conditions
imposed in the Bell and CHSH inequalities. The no-signaling condition is reinterpreted, and per-
haps further clarified, in the MOPA and statements about counterfactuality and observer dependent
QM are made.
I. INTRODUCTION
The primary realization of Einstein in Special Relativ-
ity (SR) was that the notion of simultaneity depends on
the relative motion of an observer with respect to space-
time events. The lack of a universal notion of simul-
taneity ultimately leads to the observed effects of length
contraction and time dilation. Although observers can
co-ordinate and ultimately agree on the location of events
and intervals in space-time, each observer rides their own
world line and observes events from their own perspec-
tive. Because the observed order of space-like separated
events and observed timing of events depend on an ob-
servers relative motion and location in space-time, differ-
ent world lines and thus different observers are privy to
different information at their respective space-time loca-
tions.
This naturally leads to the notion of observer depen-
dent probability distributions; observer A assigns proba-
bility distributions such as,
PA(a, b, c, ...|IA), (1)
to the propositions a, b, c, ... given their knowledge of pre-
viously observed and/or known information IA. Observer
B, by following a different world line or having a differ-
ent informational background than A, has the informa-
tion IB , and assigns a potentially different probability
distribution,
PB(a, b, c, ...|IB), (2)
to the same set of propositions. Observer dependent
probability analysis of this type will be called a Multiple
Observer Probability Analysis (MOPA).
The natural and evolutionary solution to informational
inequivalence between observers is communication. Full
communication between observers leads to a pooling of
known information. This may be represented by IA∪B =
IA ∪ IB , and thereby the observer dependent probability
distributions PA(a, b, c, ...|IA) → PA∪B(a, b, c, ...|IA∪B)
and PB(a, b, c, ...|IA) → PA∪B(a, b, c, ...|IA∪B) equili-
brate. A realist interpretation of the universe requires
two observers to agree on the outcome of events, such
that the propositions of IA and IB cannot conflict; there-
fore, the difference in information between IA and IB
cannot lead to analysis such as IA∩B = a ∧ a˜ – the il-
logical statement that a and its negation, a˜, are both
true. Because observers in general do not agree on the
lengths, times, and order of events due to SR, part of the
propositions IO known to observer O, must include, in
conjunction, the knowledge of his or her’s own world line
with reasonable certainty such that Lorentz (and other)
transformations may be applied to avoid anti-realism –
this is aptly stated in [1] as “a system of coordinates carry
no information”. This allows observer A, for instance, to
observe one frequency of light while another observer B,
in relative motion to A, observers a different frequency
of light from the same source without breaking realism.
The proper account of the information known to an ob-
server requires a great deal of attention to detail, as is
displayed in the difficulties underlying the Monte-Hall,
and like, probability problems. We take inspiration from
Einstein and assume the laws of probability and prob-
ability updating are ubiquitous among observers, while
an observer’s particular assigned probability distribution
may differ.
The struggle with publishing the correct application
of probability theory to problems in Physics is ultimately
that they lead to the same correct conclusions, and there-
fore nothing “new” is learned. In this sense, this article
is a review of Bayesian probability theory applied to Bell
2type scenarios in quantum physics. What is interesting
is that the “incorrect” use of Bayesian probability the-
ory, which ultimately leads to Bell inequalities, has gen-
erated a vast literature in telling us precisely how not
to apply probability theory rather than the statement of
how probability theory should be applied. We will review
some of the arguments that lead to Bell-like inequalities,
and then using a MOPA, show the sense in which Bell’s
inequality is not derived. This is certainty an odd type of
result, but in completing this exercise, we have found a
natural setting for Bayesian probability theory and data
analysis in SR – which includes the probability analysis
of QM as a special case.
As two space-like separated observers (Alice and Bob)
with respective measurement devices are needed to com-
plete a Bell scenario type experiment, the MOPA offers a
natural experimental account of both observers, who, due
to the retarded propagation of signals, disagree on the ob-
served order of events. In this framework, only local vari-
ables or detections may be factual, but nothing prevents
an observer from inquiring or making if-then inferences
on the counterfactual basis of a nonlocal proposition be-
ing true. Using a MOPA, we find that nonlocal viola-
tions of the CHSH inequality only occur counterfactually
as Alice (Bob) is not privy to the measurement setting
of Bob (Alice). Local violations of the CHSH inequality
using a MOPA come from either Alice and Bob agree-
ing to preset measurement settings before the experiment
or communicating measurement settings afterward. We
find a number of observer dependent probability distri-
butions that may be useful for inference, communication,
and quantum steering.
We expect the MOPA to be, more or less, notionally
compatible with interpretations of QM that are proba-
bilistic in nature, e.g. Entropic Dynamics [3] and QBism
[4], while also being compatible with interpretations that
already account for multiple observers and event order
within their framework [5]. The MOPA is also opera-
tionally compatible with all other interpretations of QM
that admit collapse and probability updating.
A. A Note on Information, Bayes Theorem, and
Marginalization:
In instances when the truthiness of a proposition, b, is
learned and happens to be correlated to a, one is obli-
gated, for the purpose of making informed judgments, to
update an old probability p(a) to a new probability,
p(a)
∗→ p(a|b). (3)
From this point of view it is natural to define information
operationally (∗) as the rationale that causes a probabil-
ity distribution to change (inspired by [1]), (3) being one
example. Given b is true, the probability of a conditional
on b, p(a|b), may be rewritten using the product rule
(where logically p(b) > 0),
p(a|b) = p(b|a)p(a)
p(b)
, (4)
which is Bayes Theorem. If it is unclear whether b is
true or its logical negation, b˜, is true, then one can use
the fact that b or its negation, b∨ b˜, is certainly true, and
make the following inference about a,
p(a, b ∨ b˜|d) = p(a, b|d) + p(a, b˜|d) =
∑
B
p(a, b|d)
= p(a|d)
∑
B
p(b|a, d) = p(a|d). (5)
This process is called marginalization, and in particular
above, b has been marginalized over to give a best guess
for a. Marginalized probabilities, such as p(a|d), may
equally be read as p(a, b∨ b˜|d), the probability of a and (b
or not b). Furthermore, using the product rule, one finds
that a marginalized distribution may be further restated
as,
p(a, b ∨ b˜|d) = p(a|b ∨ b˜, d)p(b ∨ b˜|d) = p(a|b ∨ b˜, d),(6)
meaning p(a|d) = p(a|b ∨ b˜, d), which is read the proba-
bility of a given (b or not b).
II. CHSH, NO-SIGNALING, AND MOPA
A probabilistic approach to Bell’s Theorem [6] was
given by Clauser, Horne, Shiminy, Holt (CHSH) [2], and
an excellent review of the current state of affairs is pro-
vided by [7] and the references therein. Bell’s Theorem
has manifested itself over the years in several forms: a
Bayesian account is given by [8], proofs of contextuality
and the Bell-Kochen-Specker Theorem [9–12], and more
recently the inconsistency of Causal Models with QM
[13, 14]. In the CHSH representation of Bell’s inequal-
ity, one represents a local hidden variable theory (or a
causal account) of a Bell scenario with a factorizability
condition,
p(a, b|x, y, λ) fac= p(a|x, λ)p(b|y, λ), (7)
such that the outcome a (b) is independent of the nonlo-
cal measurement setting y (x) that measures b (a), where
both outcomes may be coupled through a hidden vari-
able, or common cause, λ. As is pointed out in [13], the
common cause λ could itself be the wavefunction and the
CHSH is still violated. Directly from [7], “This factor-
izability condition simply expresses that we have found
an explanation according to which the probability for a
only depends on the past variables λ and on the local
measurement x, but not on the distant measurement and
outcome, and analogously for the probability to obtain
b.”. Marginalizing over the hidden variable of a joint
3probability distribution compounded out of the product
of (7) and p(λ) is,
p(a, b|x, y) =
∫
Λ
dλ p(λ)p(a|x, λ)p(b|y, λ). (8)
Using the above probability distribution, one can express
the CHSH inequality,
Sλ ≡ 〈ab〉00 + 〈ab〉10 + 〈ab〉01 − 〈ab〉11 ≤ 2, (9)
where 〈ab〉xy =
∑
ab ab p(a, b|x, y) takes values between
[−1, 1], for measurement settings x, y = {0, 1}. Paradox-
ical to our intuition, QM is able to violate the CHSH
SQM = 2
√
2, while the PR-box SPR = 4 maximally vio-
lates the inequality [2, 7]. It should be noted that it is a
feature of the generality of probability theory that allows
us to formulate probabilities, such as in the PR-box, that
may or may not bear physical relevance or be properly
constrained by physics.
Bell scenarios in QM and the PR-box obey the so called
no-signaling condition [7, 15],
∑
b
p(a, b|x, y) ≡ p(a|x, y) n.s.= p(a|x),
∑
a
p(a, b|x, y) ≡ p(b|x, y) n.s.= p(b|y), (10)
for all a, b, x, y, but, as is evident from the CHSH vi-
olations, the probabilities do not obey the factorization
condition (7). Strictly speaking, from a probability point
of view, the no-signaling condition, in contradiction with
its name, does not in general represent no-signaling.
What is actually represented in (10) is something
like marginal measurement setting independence, that is,
seemingly knowing the measurement setting y does not
change our state of knowledge p(a|x, y) → p(a|x) about
a. This is evident from the fact that the measurement
setting y appears in the conditional part of the proba-
bility p(a|x, y), and in this sense, it has been signaled as
its value is given, unless otherwise clarified (as we will
in the MOPA). Furthermore, marginalizations over de-
tection settings can be confused with the “no-signaling”
condition because notationally,
p(a|x, y) n.s.= p(a|x)
∼
∑
y
p(a, y|x) =
∑
y
p(a|x, y)p(y) = p(a|y ∨ y˜, x) = p(a|x),
(11)
the two lines appear to be equivalent when in fact they
are only equal iff p(a|x, y) = p(a|x) is independent of y,
for all y, which is not true in general; however, it is true
for Bell scenarios in QM and the PR-Box. Equation (10)
is still useful for determining, not no-signaling but rather
marginal measurement setting independence, which is in-
teresting in QM in its own right. Due to the possibility of
misrepresenting no-signaling through (10), we represent
no-signaling in the MOPA simply in terms of no faster
than light signaling.
As there are multiple observers in a MOPA, a nat-
ural inquiry about (7)-(10) is “who has assigned these
distributions... Alice, Bob, Charlie, or is each observer
contributing a piece?” – the latter appears to be the case
in (7), but it is difficult to know at this point, and it
should be noted that probability distributions from dif-
ferent observers are not normally combined via a product
rule.
Quantum Mechanics generates probability distribu-
tions that seemingly imply observers have access to the
value of nonlocal measurement settings at all times.
When considerations of relativity are finally made, it is
sometimes concluded that quantum mechanics must be
nonlocal rather than the reverse, that the analysis has
failed to properly capture an observer’s local informa-
tion. In reality, the assumptions of quantum theory and
relativity are at odds as much as Newtonian mechanics
and Maxwell’s theory were at odds before the notion of
simultaneity was understood – we hope to further clarify
probability theory in SR here.
III. MOPA OF BELL SCENARIOS
As is motivated in the introduction, observer depen-
dent information exists. In the Bell scenarios, an ob-
server’s locally available information is their measure-
ment settings and measurement outcomes (Alice may
know hers and Bob his, but before communication, nei-
ther know each-others). We give detailed experimen-
tal accounts of Bell scenarios in the MOPA by Alice
and Bob and track how the statistics of the experiment
change throughout the measurement process. The anal-
ysis makes it apparent who knows and who cannot know
what-when and shows that the seemingly natural factor-
ization condition is less obvious than might be expected
due the asymmetrical order of observations made by Al-
ice and Bob.
It is notationally convenient to denote a quantity that
has been locally measured, or a proposition that is known
factually to be true, to follow two vertical bars in a prob-
ability distribution, while placing counterfactual “if true”
propositions between two vertical bars such that,
p(a|b, y)→ p(a|b|y), (12)
is read, “the probability of a if b takes the value b and
given y was measured (or is known) to be y (locally)”.
For calculation purposes the second bar may be ignored
(or replaced by a comma) as p(a|b|y) = p(a|b, y) in value
but not interpretation. This helps communicate whether
a proposition in a probability distribution is counterfac-
tual (b) or factual (y). In this framework, only local
variables or detections may be factual and follow two
bars, but nothing prevents an observer from inquiring or
making if-then inferences on the counterfactual basis of
a nonlocal proposition being true.
4The generality of probability theory lets observers in-
quire about the probability of things that may or may
not happen. For instance, if in the future I get a large
pay increase + at my job J then I will probability buy a
sports car c, that is p(c| + |J) ∼ 1, when in-fact no pay
increase has been given, I do not own a sports car, but
lucky I do, in-fact, still have a job.
The MOPA, and the divvying-up of propositions into
the factual and counterfactual, leads to the assessment
that nonlocal violations of the CHSH inequality can only
occur counterfactually, and in this sense, counterfactual-
ity is itself informational nonlocality – one is able to con-
sider counterfactual changes in a probability distribution
based on nonlocal counterfactual propositions. Indeed
the objects pertaining to these nonlocal counterfactual
propositions may be well outside an observer’s light cone.
A. Initial conditions: t0
In Bell scenarios there are four main points in time
t0 < tθ < t± < tc: where t0 the initial time, tθ is the
time the measurement setting θ is chosen by their respec-
tive observer, t± the time a measurement outcome ± is
made, and tc is the latest time when the results of mea-
surement outcomes and measurement settings are com-
municated for statistical analysis. In general each time
coordinate t should have an observer label, but because
the observers are stationary in the lab frame, this index
is suppressed. It is assumed that at the time t0, both
space-like separated stationary observers Alice and Bob
know with certainty the state of the system ψ0, where
ψ0 may in general represent a classical, quantum, or PR-
box type system. At t0, we let Alice and Bob have equal
information about the state of the system, and thus they
assign equivalent joint probability distributions,
PA(±a, θa,±b, θb||ψ0, t0) = PB(±a, θa,±b, θb||ψ0, t0),
(13)
to the set of propositions {±a, θa,±b, θb}. At this time
there are something like 60 representations of the same
joint probability distribution by the product rule in all
possible fashions (permute propositions about the first
vertical bar and apply the product rule and permuta-
tions recursively). Because nothing has been measured
by either observer, these representations are in terms
of the products of counterfactually conditional probabil-
ity distributions. Each unique counterfactual conditional
probability distribution (as well as each marginalization)
represents a question that may asked by the observer
without breaking locality. Locality would be broken if a
nonlocal outcome or measurement setting of the space-
like separated event was assumed to take definite factual
values at t0.
Of these possible counterfactual probabilistic inquiries,
perhaps the most relevant at t0 is,
PA(±a,±b|θa, θb|ψ0, t0) = PB(±a,±b|θa, θb|ψ0, t0).
(14)
These distributions presumably take the same value, and
in the case of an anti-symmetric Bell state,
PQM (±a,±b|θa, θb) = 1
4
+
δ±a,∓b − δ±a,±b
4
cos(θa − θb),
(15)
(where notationally ∓b = −±b and θa, θb are the an-
gles of Alice and Bob’s measurement devices, respec-
tively), the observer dependent probability distributions
may adopt the functional form of PQM and therefore vi-
olate the CHSH inequality. However, because at t0 Alice
and Bob do not know each other’s and haven’t chosen
their own measurement settings, at best the values of
the measurement settings can be posited counterfactu-
ally. Therefore (14) reads, “Alice’s (Bob’s) probability
for ±a and ±b at t0 given the system is factually ψ0 and
if the measurement settings are set to θa and θb, has the
probability...”. Thus at t0, Alice and Bob’s probability
distributions will infact violate the CHSH inequality, but
only counterfactually since the actual values of θa and θb
are not known and are simply posited. It is possible for
Alice and Bob to posit these counterfactual probabilistic
inquiries because there is no physical issue in inquiring
about nonlocal events or possible if-then scenarios – the
issue is that without proper specification, counterfactu-
ally known propositions can be mistaken for factually
known propositions. At the time t0 it is now clear that
the CHSH inequality is only violated counterfactually.
The only way that θa and θb could be known factu-
ally by Alice and Bob is if Alice and Bob had commu-
nicated ahead of time and preset their measurement set-
tings. This situation does not capture the spirit of Bell’s
Theorem and the CHSH, as the violation would be local
(and therefore not exude “quantum nonlocal weirdness”)
as Alice and Bob had communicated ahead of time.
At this time we should really reevaluate the CHSH
inequality. Because the CHSH inequality is a sum of ex-
pectation values over different measurement settings, it
should be noted that a single experiment can in no way
factually violate the CHSH as any experiment only has
one factual set of measurement settings. By “nonlocally
violating the CHSH counterfactually at t0” we simply
mean that the functional form of PA(±a,±b|θbθa|ψ0, t0)
is the same as (15), but with θa, θb forcibly being counter-
factual by SR. To properly conform to probability theory,
the CHSH inequality is better stated as an expectation
value itself, ∑
±a,θa,±b,θb
abPA(±a, θa,±b, θb||ψ0, t0)
=
1
4
(
〈ab〉00 + 〈ab〉10 + 〈ab〉01 − 〈ab〉11
)
=
1
4
Sλ ≤ 1
2
,
(16)
5and therefore Sλ ≤ 2 for PA(θa, θb) = 14 over the mea-
surement settings θa, θb in {0, 1}. This immediately
shows that the CHSH inequality is not something that
can be factually verified in a single experiment as multi-
ple measurement settings are required. Strictly speaking,
the CHSH inequality may only be violated for a single
experiment before the measurement settings are known
factually (PA(θa, θb) < 1 for all θa, θb), and therefore non-
local violations of the CHSH inequality are completely
counterfactual as the angle dependencies in the probabil-
ities are counterfactual.
B. Alice chooses her measurement setting: tθ
Alice, being privy to the settings of her measurement
device, sets the angle to be θa mid flight t0 < tθ < t±.
Her state of knowledge before detection is therefore de-
scribed by the joint probability distribution,
PA(±a,±b, θb||θa, ψ0, tθ). (17)
Again, the counterfactual probabilistic inquiry of interest
is
PA(±a,±b|θb|θa, ψ0, tθ), (18)
which is Alice’s probability of ±a and ±b given her set-
ting is indeed at θa if Bob’s measurement device takes
the value θb. The distributions at tθ again is numerically
equal to (15), but the values of θb are at best be posited
counterfactually. Again, the only way that θb could be
known factually by Alice is if Alice and Bob had commu-
nicated its value ahead of time, which again, would not
capture the spirit of the CHSH.
If Alice has measurement uncertainty in her angle θa,
the uncertainty may be quantified by the probability dis-
tribution Q(θa), which perhaps is a narrow Gaussian
about θa. Given that is the case, Alice may write the
following joint probability distribution at tθ,
PA(±a,±b, θa, θb||ψ0, tθ)
= PA(±a,±b, θb||θa, ψ0, tθ)Q(θa), (19)
which is (18) multiplied by the measurement uncertainty
Q(θa). In all cases of interest, local quantities that may
in principle be known “factually” follow two vertical bars
and may be multiplied by a measurement uncertainty dis-
tribution Q to form the full joint probability distribution
after a detection has been done. If the measurement is
precise, then Q may be a Kronecker or Dirac delta func-
tion at the detected value. It should be noted that Al-
ice is in no way forced to marginalize over Bob’s device
setting or measurement outcomes – she may marginalize
over them if she chooses to make further inquiries on that
basis.
In the peculiar situation in which Alice knows she has
set the measurement angle to θa ∈ {0, 1} but has failed
to verify which value θa actually is, then again (19) may
be used to counterfactually violate (16). In this case
Alice is in the unusual predicament where she knows the
measurement setting has a definite value within her local
light cone but the precise information is unaccessible for
whatever reason (perhaps she heard a click but that did
not specify θa). We will continue to denote the value of θa
behind double bars as it is “local in her light cone”, but
in principle it does not hurt to also consider its precise
value as counterfactual as, in some sense, Alice is not
within the “signal velocity-time” cone (or paths) of the
measurement setting’s signal.
C. Alice makes her measurement: t±
If Alice detects the spin value of an entangled parti-
cle measured along θa, then there are less counterfactual
inquires she can make. Her updated distribution of the
entire system is therefore,
PA(±b, θb||±a, θa, ψ0, t±), (20)
and there are only 2 counterfactual questions that may
be asked at this time,
PA(±b|θb|±a, θa, ψ0, t±), (21)
PA(θb| ±b |±a, θa, ψ0, t±), (22)
and 2 marginals,
PA(±b||±a, θa, ψ0, t±), (23)
PA(θb||±a, θa, ψ0, t±). (24)
Using the counterfactual probability distributions (21)
and (22) Alice can guess what Bob’s device will read out
if Bob chooses the angle θb or guess his most probable
angle if Bob detects ±b. These are specific examples
of Alice using Bayes Theorem to make inferences about
what Bob will get based on her local measurements.
Usually Alice can measure ±a more or less with com-
plete certainty Q(±a) = δ±a,±′a , but she will have some
uncertainty Q(θa) about the measurement setting. Her
new joint probability distribution over the whole system
at t± is,
PA(±a, θa,±b, θb||ψ0, t±)
= PA(±b, θb||±a, θa, ψ0, t±)Q(θa)Q(±a). (25)
At this time it is noteworthy to consider the counterfac-
tual probabilistic inquiry,
PA(±a,±b|θb|θa, ψ0, t±)
= Q(±a)PA(±b|θb|±a, θa, ψ0, t±). (26)
This distribution only obeys a subset of the statistics that
is obeyed by (15), simply because Alice has actually mea-
sured the outcome of her measurement device to be ±′a.
This is not an issue with the analysis, rather the process
is overly describing the whole measurement and detec-
tion process, which therefore involves “collapse” when a
detection is made, changing the statistics.
6Again Alice could only nonlocally violate the CHSH
counterfactually. If one wishes, similar arguments to last
paragraph in Section B could be made about Alice not
knowing exact values of ±a, θa to formulate the nonlo-
cal violation of the CHSH counterfactually for this single
trial.
D. Bob communicates his measurement angle, his
measurement outcome, or both to Alice: tc
At this latest time tc, the process of communication
completely determines the outcomes of the experiment
so in principle everything is known: Bob tells Alice θb
(with uncertainty QB(θb) = QA(θb) given the communi-
cation channel is noiseless), as well as for ±b. Alice and
Bob agree on the final joint probability distribution after
communication,
PA(±a, θa,±b, θb||ψ0, tc)
= PB(±a, θa,±b, θb||ψ0, tc)
= Q(θa)Q(±a)Q(θb)Q(±b). (27)
which represents the state of knowledge of a single out-
come of the experiment, as their information is pooled
IA∪B. Because the Q distributions represent macroscopic
measurement uncertainty (not weak measurement) they
are well behaved in the sense that the experimental data
is the unique set of propositions which maximize (27),
denoted di = {θ′a,±′a, θ′b,±′b} – the data for experiment
i. Repeating this experiment N times allows one to es-
timate the probability distribution (13) via its frequency
using a multinomial distribution. The inferred distribu-
tion may be used to estimate the statistical expectation
values of (13) with uncertainty ∝ 1√
N
by the central limit
theorem. Tomographically complete data allows for the
sampling (or experimental) distribution to span the full
probability space of the statistical distribution – meaning
all values of θa, θb should be inspected to fully describe
the system. It should be noted that because the state
has effectively collapsed, the n-moment set of expecta-
tion values of (27) in no way match the expectation val-
ues from (13). Communication between Alice and Bob is
required for experimental verification, and therefore the
full set of information becomes local for both observers.
Learning Bob’s measurement angle and outcome, Alice
may retrodictively explain the likelihood of her measure-
ment outcome. In some instances, these kind of two-time
inferences may be written using a factual current time
and a secondary counterfactual time – Alice’s retrodic-
tive inference of the likelihood of her measurement out-
come after tθ may be stated as PA(±a|tθ|θa,±b, θb, tc),
as the information is known factually at tc.
The probability analysis for Bob is the same as Al-
ice, except with a’s and b’s swapped due to the simple
symmetry in the problem. The primary probability dis-
tributions of interest are listed in the table below:
Alice Bob =?
t0 PA(±a, θa,±b, θb||ψ0, t0) PB(±a, θa,±b, θb||ψ0, t0) y
tθ PA(±a,±b, θb||θa, ψ0, tθa) PB(±a, θa,±b||θb, ψ0, tθb) n
t± PA(±b, θb||±a, θa, ψ0, t±) PB(±a, θa||±b, θb, ψ0, t±) n
tc Q(θa)Q(±a)Q(θb)Q(±b) Q(θa)Q(±a)Q(θb)Q(±b) y,
The last column assigns a yes, y, or a no n if the distribu-
tions are equal or not equal. Counterfactual conditional
and marginal distributions may be generated from these
joint distributions at their respective times and measure-
ment uncertainty may be included on factual proposi-
tions. Other experimental designs, which might involve
reversing or omitting observations at tθ or t± by either
observer are also possible.
E. Discussion
Provided above is a MOPA for Alice and Bob in a Bell
scenario, where the lack of a consistent observed order
of events, from SR, has been assumed and accounted for
probabilistically. Locality in the MOPA is simply repre-
sented by the particular order in which Alice or Bob are
signaled information, and when received, update their
distributions factually. Because the full factual account
of an experiment requires all of the information to be
local (i.e. communicated), there is no experiment that
allows for the testing of nonlocal signaling, as any non-
local manipulations cannot be observed, by the fact that
all signals are local. As has been highlighted through
this analysis, this does not prevent nonlocal observers
from making counterfactual inferences or inquiries, and
it is in this sense that locality is only violated counter-
factually. In this analysis QM has been assumed, and
yet the only “nonlocal” violations of the CHSH inequal-
ity are counterfactual in nature. This should perhaps be
expected being that measurements in QM are effectively
“classical” and therefore “nonlocal factual” violations of
the CHSH is nonsensical in these definitions.
One point of interest is that the MOPA clashes with
the usual motivation for the factorization condition
p(a, b|x, y, λ) = p(a|x, λ)p(b|y, λ) and its marginalization
(8) that inevitably satisfy the CHSH inequality. Before a
factorization condition could be stipulated in the MOPA
one would need to first address, who is assigning the dis-
tribution and what information is this observer privy to
at that time? That is, the factorization condition needs
an observer label (A, B, or C) and perhaps the inclu-
sion of the double vertical bar notation to divide factual
and counterfactual propositions. The MOPA does not
represent locality with a factorization condition, so fac-
torization is not an obvious step in the MOPA. Because
locality is represented as the factual account of observa-
tions made by the observers, this analysis coherently gels
probability theory and SR.
The no-signaling condition p(a|x, y) n.s.= p(a|x) in the
MOPA may be stated more exactly. If y is known fac-
7tually by Alice, pA(a||x, y) n.s.= pA(a||x), it implies y was
indeed signaled by Bob, which is then local. If instead y
is not signaled, one could consider the value of y counter-
factually, and then pA(a|y|x) n.s.= pA(a||x) is a statement
about measurement setting independence if the measure-
ment setting were set to y – which then again is a state-
ment that is independent of whether y is local or not. In
either case, the no-signaling condition is better stated as
a marginal measurement setting independence. An inter-
esting note is that statements which are known to be true
(such as b∨ b˜) are factually known to be true locally and
nonlocally by observers per the definition of factuality;
therefore, marginalized variables have a factual nature
over their disjunction as eventually one of them in prin-
ciple may be learned to be factually true, yet one may
still consider a subset of b∨b˜ counterfactually before mea-
surement.
The mystery that entangled states present, is not no-
signaling or marginal measurement setting independence,
but rather is the fact that QM generates a joint proba-
bility distribution,
PQM (±a,±b|θa, θb) = 1
4
+
δ±a,∓b − δ±a,±b
4
cos(θa − θb),
over a pair of observables ±a and ±b that is conditioned
on an unfactorisable cos(θa− θb) term over measurement
settings. The explicit reason, or understanding, of why
this unfactorisable correlation term is present in QM is
not addressed by a MOPA. What is addressed is that
because a nonlocal violation of the CHSH can only “hap-
pen” counterfactually, factual experimental verifications
of nonlocal violations of the CHSH are nonsensical. Lo-
cal violations of the CHSH may occur factually or coun-
terfactually; however, in these instances the correlations
between the detector settings and outcomes may be at-
tributed to local interactions (or perhaps local entan-
glement mechanisms [5]). Because at best a MOPA’s
probability distributions conditional on nonlocal propo-
sitions require their dependence to be counterfactual, it
implies that the probability distributions given by QM
have counterfactual dependences on the measurement
settings, that is,
PQM (±a,±b|θa, θb)→ PQM (±a,±b|θa, θb|...), (28)
as it can never be verified otherwise by any observer.
This implies that PQM ’s, which are usually used in local
small scale experiments and thus do not require observer
labels (a local observer symmetry of sorts), in general
require observer labels. Using QM in a general setting
thereby requires observer labels to fully describe experi-
ments with nonlocal propositions, which is in favor of a
probabilistic and epistemic interpretations of QM.
The nonlocal counterfactual CHSH inequality is a
statement of what is expected to occur (it is a sum of
expectation values) rather than what will actually oc-
cur or is currently occurring – which then removes it
somewhat from an “element of reality” to a quantity of
epistemology. At t±, Alice measures her particle and
from it can infer what combination of ±b and θb Bob
is most likely to report to her at tc. Given the realist
view of physics adopted here, that IA∪B be free of con-
tradictions, Bob cannot report zero probability events to
Alice as they both agree with one another’s distributions
initially at t0 (13). It is this requirement for realism
that keeps Bob’s measured values in check with Alice’s
perspective and vice-versa. The set of zero probability
events are known from the outset at t0, and the situation
remains so through tc given the initial conditions ψ0 are
known precisely and remain so.
Because the operation of a Stern-Gerlach device is to
entangle the spins of particles with their positions such
that they may be detected on a screen, for a fully inter-
pretable analysis of the Bell experiment in the MOPA,
the positional part of the wavefunction |Ψ〉 should be
taken into account during Bell experiments such that par-
ticle spins |χ〉 → |χ,Ψ〉, which allows arguments about
location and locality to be made with more rigor. The ex-
tra structure provided by |Ψ〉 gives additional positional
information that is neglected if positions are marginal-
ized. Having positional information would allow one to
better represent locality arguments in the mathematics
rather than having to appeal to linguistics as is widely
done and was done here.
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